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ABSTRACT
Thls report describes the design of the Clean Access Platform at the
John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC), beginning wlth the design requirements
and tracing the effort throughout development and manufacturing. It also
contains:
a. A system description
b. Testing requirements and conclusions
c. Safety and rellabIllty features
d. Major problems experienced during the project
e. Lessons learned, including features necessary for the effective
design of mechanisms used in clean systems
INTRODUCTION
Due to upcoming sensitive sc_entlfic payloads, cleanliness has become
an increasingly visible Issue at KSC. The capabilities of Intricate and
expensive payloads can be impeded severely by even the slightest partlculate
contaminant. Designated as Class I00,OO0, the Payload Changeout Room (PCR)
Clean Room, the facility used to clean the Orbiter payload bay, Is governed
by stringent National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
specifications that dictate standards of cleanliness measurable in
O.5-micron units.
In response to the stringent demands for cleanliness, KSC has
establlshed a Contamination Control Program. As part of thls effort, the
Orbiter Payload Bay is cleaned immediately prior to payload installation.
Cleaning occurs wlth the Orbiter In a vertical posltlon at the launch pad,
and the PCR mated to the Orbiter. However, in order to access all areas of
the payload bay for cleaning, a vertically moving platform is necessary.
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In the past, a Llne Replaceable Unit (LRU) platform was used to access
the payload bay. However, the platform was designed prior to the current
emphasis for strict cleanllness standards. As a result, the platform
contrlbuted greatly to partlcIe contamlnatlon in the room. Specifically,
the system had eight wire ropes and four sheaves entering the PCR, and had
numerous exposed rollers. Moreover, the platform Itself was fabricated of
carbon steel. C1eanllness aside, the holstlng system was unstable and
required labor-intensive manlpuIatlon to coordinate the pneumatically and
electrIcally operated hoists.
Because of these inadequacies, the platform was determined to be
unacceptable, and a new design was called for: The new deslgn is called the
Clean Access Platform or CAP. The CAP is a new vertlcally moving platform
wlth extenslble fingers and slde-rotatlng extensions to provide access to
all areas of the payload bay. Wherever posslble, this new platform has been
designed to incorporate not only safety features, but also cleanliness
features. See figure l for a view of the CAP assembly.
Installatlon of the CAP at Pad 39A was completed In October 1989, and
operatlon was initiated with STS-32R on November 29, 1989. Full operational
capablllty was achieved for STS-36 In February 1990.
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Figure I. Clean Access Platform Assembly
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REQUIREMENTS
After the payload has been installed In the Payload Ground Handling
Hechanlsm (PGHM) In the PCR, and the Orbiter has been moved to the launch
pad, the Rotating Service Structure (RSS) and the PCR are rotated to the
Orbiter mate posltlon. The PCR doors and the Orbiter Payload Bay Doors are
then opened, enabling final cleaning of the Orblter Payload Bay.
Access Is required to the Orbiter Payload Bay Inner mold 11ne and to
the Payload Bay Door inner surfaces from the Orbiter Payload Bay forward
bulkhead to the aft bulkhead. The Clean Access Platform is designed to pro-
vide thls access. Figure 2 Illustrates the CAP in the deployed posltlon.
To provlde access to the Orbiter Payload Bay, the CAP must meet the
following requirements"
a. The CAP must carry a llve load of 680 kilograms (1500 pounds) (six
technlclans with tools).
Do Access must be to within 30 centimeters (12 Inches) of the Orblter
Payload Bay inner mold 11ne, but no closer than 15 centimeters (6
Inches).
c. To meet time constraints, the CAP must be deployed and stowed In 2
hours maximum.
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Figure 2. CAP (Deployed)
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In operation, the CAP must reach any Iocatlon in the Orbiter
Payload Bay within lO minutes.
Operation must be clean for both up-down movement and for
extenslon-retractlon of the platforms to ensure that the Class
1OO,OOO Clean Room condltlons in the PCR are not Jeopardized.
When stowed, the CAP must not interfere with normal payload
operat|ons in the PCR.
The CAP Hoist System must meet NASA requirements for a man-rated
platform so that technicians can ride on the main platform as the
CAP is raised or lowered. Figure 3 Illustrates the CAP and the
safety features requlred.
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Figure 3. CAP Safety Features
The Clean Access Platform must be available for contingency access
to the payload after installation in the Orbiter Payload Bay.
To accomplish contingency servicing, the CAP must be capable of
handling the Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) Crane and other payload
Ground Support Equipment (GSE).
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DESIGN CONCEPT
After studies of alternate concepts, the design of a new moving plat-
form simllar to the existing LRU platform was chosen. However, that basic
design was upgraded to provide additional access to the Orbiter Payload Bay
Door inner surfaces, to permlt technicians to ride the platform, and to
operate in the PCR Clean Room environment.
The Clean Access Platform and Hoist System was designed by the Lockheed
Mechanisms Design Section with support from Structures, Pneumatlcs/GN2, and
E1ectrlcal Design groups. Design was accompllshed using the Autotrol Com-
puter Aided Design (CAD) system.
The final design consists of a maln platform with Intermediate and se-
condary extension platforms and rotating and extenslble wlng platforms on
either side.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
The CAP consists of a hoist system, a control system, strongbacks and a
stabilizer, rotating wing platforms, and extension platforms. All of these
elements have unique functions and design characteristlcs.
Hoisting System
The hoisting system consists of two independent, commercial,
off-the-shelf, 9100-kilogram (10-ton) hoist units, and was designed in
accordance with NSS/GO 1740.9 and ANSI A120.I. The use of off-the-shelf
hoists provides proven rellabillty and e1|minates new system development
problems. Dual hoists were chosen for safety reasons. Moreover, a total
failure of any one hoist will not cause the loss of the platform system.
Due to thls feature, the hoisting system is unique at KSC. Figure 4 is an
overview of the CAP holst system.
Because of the long procurement lead time involved, the hoists were
sized and selected early in the design phase. At that time, a large portion
of the platform was anticipated to be stainless steel, and therefore much
heavier than the current design. Consequently, the safety factors on the
hoist system are greater than the required 8 to I.
The hoists have slngle-part reeving w|th slngle-layer, dual,
2-centimeter (3/4-inch) wire ropes on their drums. The ropes are routed
through sheaves from a remote hoist equipment room into the PCR Clean Room.
Four wlre ropes, two from each hoist, enter the PCR and attach d|rectly to
each side of the platform, ellminating the use of sheaves within the PCR.
The number of wire ropes entering the PCR is held to a minimum. The
previous access system had eight wire ropes and four sheaves that were sus-
pected to be major contributors to the particle contamination in the PCR.
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Figure 4. CAP Hoist System
Dual ropes are used to provide a rope to both sides of the platform
from each hoist so that failure of a single hoist will not cause the
platform to tilt. A slngle-layer grooved drum Is used to limit the uneven
rope take-up that is inherent In multi-layer rope drums. Single-part
reeving minimizes the number of moving wlre ropes in the Clean Room, thereby
e11mlnatlng the requirement for wire rope sheaves at the platform.
Control System
The control system is 120 volts alternating current wlth dual con-
factors operatlng both hoists. A portable operating station Is situated on
the platform, along with a remote, flxed supervisory station. Remote
emergency stop stations are located at various vertical travel intervals.
Additlonal safety features include overload/underload sensors at each holst
attach point, slack rope switches at the hoists, operatlonal travel limit
switches, and overtravel 11mlt swltches.
The supervisory station has override capability to take control of the
system from the operator's statlon on the platform. The emergency stop con-
trois also are manned, and can stop the motlon of the platform at any time.
The overload/underload sensors, slack rope switch, and overtravel 11mit
switch are wlred to a shunt trlp circult breaker located In a locked cabi-
net. Trlp out of thls clrcult beaker shuts down the system. Further, the
circuit breaker cannot be reset by Operations personnel. This feature en-
sures that serious problems w111 be resolved before resuming platform
operations.
The control clrcult conductors are routed through an umblllcal which
must be connected and disconnected each time the platform Is used. Thls
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arrangement created a problem early in the platform's use. Speclflcally,
the control switches were norma]ly open to accommodate the connect and dls-
connect operations; thus, the operators were able to disconnect the safety
sensors and operate the platform. As a result, a circuit was added to
detect when the umbilical Is disconnected.
Strongbacks And Stabilizer
The 18-meter-long (60-foot-long) strongback Is a truss structure
fabricated from stainless steel wlth a structural tall gulde assembly that
guides the platform vertlcally and carrles the overturning moments created
when the platform Is used. The strongback Is foldable to meet clearance
constraints, and to keep the guide rail as close as possible to the hoist
attach polnt in order to ]Imlt holst-induced moments.
The stabilizer Is a roller assembly that rides In the strongback guide
tall and has expandable latch plns to connect It to the platforms. Moment
loads are transmitted from the platform, through the stabilizer rollers, and
into the strongback.
Rotatlng Htng Platforms
The rotating wlng platforms are attached to the slde of the platform.
The platforms not only have an alr-tool operated rotating drlve (see
figure 5), but they also have an extenslble element operated by an air tool
that provides the motive force for the drive mechanism.
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Figure 5. Rotatlng Wlng Platform
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A telescoping section was added within the rotating wing to provlde
clearance with the Remote Manipulator System (RMS). Both sections have
hand-held, alr-operated tools that provide the motive force.
One of the problems experienced with the platforms was backdrlvlng of
the rotating mechanism. Specifically, workers standing on the floor could
push on the slde of the wlng with little effort and cause the platform to
rotate. The drive mechanism gearbox was a lO0-to-I worm gear. Past expe-
rlence wlth worm drives Indicates that drives wlth ratios of greater than
approxlmateIy 50 to l will not backdrlve. Therefore, no problems were anti-
cipated with backdrlvlng. However, in actuality, the gearbox was a
doubIe-reductlon worm gear with each reductlon having a ratio of lO to I.
The problem was solved by installing a ratchet device on the wing ring
gear to lock the wing in position when deployed. The ratchet device Is
independent of the drive mechanism.
Extension Platforms
The extension platforms consist of an intermediate platform that
extends horizontally from the main platform and carr|es three slde-by-slde
finger platforms that extend from It. In turn, the ends of the finger plat-
forms have hand-deployed fllp platforms to ensure complete access to the
empty payload bay of the Space Shuttle Orbiter.
The drive mechanisms (see figures 6 and 7) for the intermediate and
flnger platforms are of the same design and, 11ke the rotating wing
platforms, use a hand-held air motor to provide the motive force. The
mechanism is sophisticated, prlmarily due to the need for it to be
self-supportlng and to accommodate the relatively large angular and linear
deflections of the alumlnum platforms.
MAIN PLATFORM
_. /__% F
INTERMEDIATE PLATFORM
FINGER DRIVE MECHANISM
FINGER
PLATFORMS
DRIVE
Figure 6. CAP Extension Drives
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The mechanism is a ball screw device with a traveling nut containing
recircu]atlng balls. The unit is gimba]led on one end and free on the
other, has a floating gearbox, and has independent thrust bearings for the
rotating screw. The traveling ball nut Is gimba]led at its attach point on
the extending platform, and slides on cantilevered guide tubes to provide
support for the screw.
The ball screw is able to translate slightly in the guide tube fixture
using thrust bearings configured to allow only tension loading of the screw.
Durlng platform extension, compressive loads in the dr|ve are transferred to
the guide tubes at the forward end of the screw. The elimination of column
loadlng in the ball screw enabled the use of a signlflcantly lighter screw,
thereby reducing deflection at the end of the cantilever.
Slight backdrlvlng problems also were encountered with the flnger
platform drive system, and were solved with a spring-actuated locking device
that unlocks when depressed by the hand-held drive motor.
TESTING
In-plant testing consisted of simulated hoisting, load tests, and
testing of the extenslble drlve mechanlsm assemblies. Load tests and
hoisting tests were conducted at the vendor's plant so that the vendor's
facilitles would be readily available in case of any major problems.
Hoist system testing, including function tests and proofloading, was
performed at KSC, as was proofloading of the strongback assemblies. Speclal
test fixtures were designed to perform the load tests with the hardware
inside the PCR.
Fu11-up system testing was conducted after all components were In-
stalled, and included a static proofload equal to 150 percent of the safe
working load of the platform. Addltionally, dynamic testing at 100-percent
load was conducted.
Testing revealed that the system has a tendency to oscillate at
approximately l hertz whlle being raised in slow speed. The problem was
less pronounced in high speed and appeared to occur when the stabilizer
rollers contacted joints in the wear plates on the strongback guide rails.
The problem was resolved by smoothing the wear plate joints and could also
be eliminated by retracting the platforms while raising the unit.
SAFETY AND RELIABILITY
In addition to a dual-hoist system with redundant load brakes, safety
limit switches, and emergency stop stations, the CAP is equipped with
removable handrails and emergency egress ladders. Associated operation
instructions dictate that all tools on the platform be tethered, and that
the number of passengers on the platform be llmited to six. Moreover, CAP
operators recelve special training prlor to certification.
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A System Assurance Analysis (SAA) revealed a single failure point in
the extensible platform drives, and corrective action has been taken.
PROBLEMS
Problem No. 1
The main problem encountered during the design phase of the project was
due to startup complications associated with the use of the new CAD system.
This project was the first one worked by the Mechanisms group that was accom-
plished exclusively with CAD. The original plan was to build 3D models and
produce the drafted drawings from the models. However, the performance
limitations of 3D soon became evident, and the plan was modified to use 2D
layouts and drawings with 3D used only for envelope models of the structure
and platform. File corruption due to new software was a major problem, and
continued to plague efforts right up to the final drawing release.
Problem No. 2
A major problem during fabrication concerned weld failures and dls-
tortlon due to poor selection of welding sequences. The fabricator was
constrained by a stringent schedule, and thus did not always use balanced
welding techniques. Therefore, some weld fractures occurred due to
locked-in stresses. To compensate for possible unreliable welds, mechanical
bolt-on brackets were designed for critical locations.
Problem No. 3
Major problems were experienced when deploylng/stowing the CAP due to a
minor misplacement [5 centimeters (2 inches)] of the strongbacks during
installation. The CAP slde attachment brackets were redesigned to correct
this problem.
LESSONS LEARNED
The following lessons were learned from this design effort:
a, Cleanliness must be designed into clean systems. During the design
phase, the followlng features should be incorporated wherever
possible:
(I) Use closed sections (for example, tubes) rather than I-beams.
(2) Use rollers instead of slides.
(3) E1imlnate as many moving parts as possible.
(4) If moving parts are unavoidable, enclose them if possible.
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(5) Use corroslon-reslstant materlals.
(6> Use smooth surfaces for ease of cleanlng.
(7) Grind welds smooth and eliminate any gaps or crevices.
When fabr|catlng clean systems, cleanliness must be maintained
starting with the fabrication process, and continuing throughout
manufacturing.
The CAD system greatly increased the capabilities of the design
engineers to perform tolerance build-up and clearance studies,
thereby eliminating manufacturing and fabrication problems before
they occurred.
The CAD system also allowed the design engineers to rapidly perform
"what if" studies to dea] with fabrication and installation errors.
Start-up CAD projects should have the most enthusiastic and
competent engineers and designers assigned.
Major designer Involvement is required in the fabrication testing
and valldat_on phases of a project to maintain high quality.
Installatlon requirements and tolerances must be documented
clearly, and a new survey of the area must be completed to ensure
the proper location of critical elements.
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